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1Enhancing the legitimacy of offices for future generations:
the case for public participation 
Graham Smith
Abstract
Independent offices for future generations (OFGs) are rare amongst institutional 
designs that aim to ameliorate short termism in democracies. Drawing on the 
experience of OFGs in Israel, Hungary and Wales, the paper argues that such 
institutions face at least three challenges to their legitimacy. First, the capacity of an 
unelected agency to constrain government and law-making. Second, the ability of a 
single office to adequately represent the plurality of interests within and across 
future generations. Third, their political fragility and vulnerability. The article 
develops the counterintuitive argument that OFGs can enhance their democratic 
legitimacy through embedding systematic public participation in their activities, in 
particular through the institutionalization of deliberative mini-publics.
Introduction
Democracies are beset by short-termism that is often harmful to the interests of 
future generations. Lack of action on climate change is perhaps the paradigmatic 
case of failure to consider the long-term, to the point where terms like ‘crisis’, 
‘breakdown’ and ‘emergency’ are becoming commonplace. Solutions to the long-
term storage of nuclear waste materials are postponed. Technological advances, 
such as biotechnology, cybertechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence, promise 
enormous economic and social benefits, but little attention is given to the long-term 
deleterious effects they may bring to economic and social life and the environment. 
In more traditional areas of social and public policy, governments continue to 
obfuscate in the face of ageing populations that will place significant stress on 
pensions and health and social care; and fail to invest strategically in infrastructure, 
undermining the future reliability of utility distribution systems, transport networks 
and the availability of housing stock. Our democratic systems appear to be 
structurally dysfunctional in their capacity to deal with the costs and political risks 
associated with long-term issues and to consider the interests of future generations 
in any systematic manner. Critics point to a range of explanations for ‘democratic 
2myopia’, including: individual-level psychological traits; characteristics of the 
political system such as short electoral cycles, the actions of entrenched social and 
economic interests and the lack of presence of future generations to defend their 
interests; and dynamics of contemporary capitalism (e.g. MacKenzie, 2017a; Caney 
2019).
A number of institutional remedies to ameliorate harmful short-termism within 
democracies have been proposed and, in some cases, implemented (Boston, 2016; 
González-Ricoy and Gosseries, 2017). Most attention has been placed on reforms 
to the established institutions of contemporary democratic polities, namely the 
constitution and the structure and practices of the legislature. Clauses that specify 
the rights of future generations and/or nature or particular long-term ends such as 
environmental sustainability are increasingly incorporated within constitutions.  
They aim to constrain the actions of governments and other social actors and/or 
give citizens procedural participatory rights, particularly around environmental 
decision making. Legislative proposals have focused on mitigating particular drivers 
of harmful short-termism: longer terms of office to reduce the impact of short 
electoral cycles, guaranteed legislative (proxy) representation for future generations 
and reductions in the electoral power of older generations, either by removing their 
voting rights or giving greater weight to the votes of young people. The Finnish 
Parliament is unusual in the establishment of a relatively influential Committee for 
the Future, a cross-party body that deliberates on parliamentary documentation, 
makes submissions to other committees and engages in scenario modelling. 
This paper takes as its point of departure the growing interest in a relatively new 
piece of institutional architecture: offices for future generations (OFGs). OFGs have 
moved from proposal to institutionalization in a small number of polities, most 
prominently Hungary, Israel and Wales. A shared characteristic of OFGs is their 
independence, but they can take on a diversity of structures and powers, operating 
within or across legislative, executive or judicial branches of government. While 
OFGs have been empowered to delay or suspend actions, their function differs 
from proposals for guardian-type bodies that sit above democratic politics 
(Brennan, 2016; Shearman and Smith, 2007).
OFGs are not an institutional ‘silver bullet’ for dealing with harmful short-termism in 
contemporary democratic politics. The Israeli OFG was abolished after one 
parliamentary term and the powers and status of the Hungarian body diminished. 
However, careful analysis of the workings and fate of this institutional phenomenon 
offers insights into how such institutions might better protect the interests of future 
3generations in democratic polities. The article argues that to be effective in their 
work, OFGs need to respond to a number of challenges to their democratic 
legitimacy, namely the right of an independent body to constrain the actions of the 
legislature, their political vulnerability and their capacity to come to robust 
judgements about the interests of future generations. These legitimacy challenges 
raise both normative (the extent to which OFGs act in accordance with democratic 
ideals) and sociological (the legitimacy of the institution in the eyes of the public) 
concerns (Mansbridge, 2012; Beetham, 2013). 
The article draws on a comparison of the practices of three OFGs in Hungary, Israel 
and Wales. Having laid out the characteristics of each OFG, we move to an 
analysis of the deficits of legitimacy faced by these institutions. We then turn to a 
counterintuitive solution to these legitimacy deficits: systematically embedding 
public participation in the working of an OFG can enhance its democratic legitimacy 
in both normative and sociological terms. Such a strategy is counterintuitive 
because public attitudes and practices are typically recognized as one of the key 
determinants of short-termism. However, well-crafted public participation can, first, 
improve the capacity of an OFG to distinguish and balance the plurality of 
perspectives on the interests of future generations so as to prioritize action and, 
secondly, increase the political standing of OFGs, thus reducing their vulnerability 
within the political system. The final section of the paper offers evidence to suggest 
that amongst participatory designs, deliberative mini-publics are particularly well-
suited to encouraging long-term thinking and judgements.
Three cases: Israel, Hungary and Wales
The Commission for Future Generations was established in Israel in 2001 but 
lasted only for one term of office until 2006. The Commission had extensive rights 
to information and participation in the workings of the Knesset and other 
governmental bodies, in particular rights to: obtain information from all government 
entities; examine any parliamentary bill and secondary legislation where it judged 
potential harm on future generations; and request reasonable time to prepare an 
opinion from any parliamentary committee discussing a bill (Shoham and Lamay, 
2006: 247; Shoham, 2010). While the right to information often generated material 
that would not generally be in the public domain, it was the power to request time to 
prepare an opinion that proved most significant since it generated the capacity to 
delay legislation. As the first (and only) Knesset Commissioner, Shlomo Shoham 
notes: ‘The commissioner can introduce uncomfortable delays… on issues he 
deems critical – but in doing so, he risks drawing antagonism from all sides. Thus, 
4this authority was rarely invoked; when it was, it was done implicitly and behind the 
scenes rather than in a formal manner’ (Shoham, 2010: 103). The Commission was 
empowered to engage on any subject on the parliament’s agenda, excluding 
defense and foreign affairs, but aimed to select issues where it would have the 
most scope for effect, including education, health, environment, the national 
economy and budget and science and technology.
The Hungarian Parliamentary Commissioner for Future Generations was 
established in 2008, but lasted in that form only until 2011. It is the closest of the 
three OFGs to a classic Ombudsman. The powers of the Commissioner rested on 
Hungarian Fundamental Law that establishes that the state and every person is 
obliged to protect, sustain and preserve the environment for future generations. 
Again, only one Commissioner, Sándor Fülöp, has held this role. The 
Commissioner was empowered to conduct investigations on citizens’ complaints 
and to appeal to the Constitutional Court or the Curia of Hungary (supreme court) in 
cases where national or local legislation may be in violation of the Fundamental 
Law. The Ombudsman Act, which was amended in 2007 to enable the 
establishment of the new Parliamentary Commissioner, included the power to 
suspend administrative actions where it was perceived to be in violation of the 
Fundamental Law. While this remained a threat, the Commissioner never actually 
used the power – both because it would have been difficult to sustain with its 
relatively small staff and on the philosophical grounds that the application of the 
right would have altered the nature of the body into a governing rather than 
oversight institution (Interview, 2017). The activities of the Commissioner stretched 
beyond classic ombudsman functions to parliamentary advocacy – aimed at 
ensuring that public policy and legislative proposals did not pose a severe threat to 
future generations – and strategic development and research in the areas of its 
competence (more of a ‘think tank’ function). Of the three OFGs, the Hungarian 
Commissioner had the narrowest remit, focusing primarily on environmental 
protection. In 2011, with a change in the Hungarian constitution, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner was converted into a Deputy Ombudsman for Future Generations 
under the General Ombudsman. In comparison to the original Commissioner the 
new institution has a tiny staff and no right of investigation or opinion without the 
agreement of the General Ombudsman. This paper will focus on the experience of 
the earlier Commissioner with its more extensive range of powers.
The third case is a more recent creation. The Future Generations Commissioner for 
Wales was established in 2016 under the Wellbeing of Future Generations (Wales) 
5Act 2015. The first holder of that role is Sophie Howe. Sustainable development is a 
core principle in the UK Act of Parliament that devolved powers to the Welsh 
Assembly in 1999; the Future Generations Act the legislative realization of this 
principle. The Wellbeing of Future Generations Act places a duty on government 
ministries and public authorities to consider future generations in their activities, 
laying out a number of ways of working (including long-term thinking) and wellbeing 
goals and sustainable development principles that it expects ministries and public 
bodies to embody. The Commissioner’s role is to oversee that process, providing 
support and challenging short-term policies and practices. It is charged with 
encouraging the full range of ministries, public bodies and public service boards to 
take greater account of the long-term impact of their actions and to monitor and 
assess the extent to which wellbeing objectives are being met by these bodies. It 
has an array of powers, including: provision of advice, research, reviews of public 
bodies and recommendations for action and the publication of a Future Generations 
Report one year before an Assembly election that contains an assessment of the 
improvements public bodies need to take. Compared to its Hungarian and Israeli 
counterparts, it does not have equivalent parliamentary rights and powers: its focus 
is on the actions of the executive (the Welsh Government) and the 43 other public 
bodies and public service boards in Wales. 
These three cases have been selected because they are the most prominent 
examples of independent agencies that have been designed and institutionalized 
specifically to defend and promote the interests of future generations in democratic 
polities. The diverse structure and practices of the three bodies provide an 
indication of how complicated it can be to classify this family of institutions, even if 
we do not extend the category to Commissioners and Ombudsmen for Children and 
the Environment which we find in other polities (Boston, 2016: 322). In all three 
cases, the OFGs have been designed and constituted explicitly to compensate for a 
particular dysfunctionality of political institutions: the structural tendency to give 
priority to the short-term. The ambition for these institutions is to provide a clear and 
specific voice for future generations within the political system, operating outside 
electoral-party motivations and independent from established interests.
The democratic legitimacy of OFGs
The promise of OFGs is that they bring a consistent, independent and impartial 
voice into the democratic polity that aims to protect and promote the interests of 
future generations. The normative legitimacy of OFGs rests on their capacity to 
reshape political decision-making such that endemic harmful short-termism is 
6ameliorated. In sociological terms, OFGs are well placed to enhance the perceived 
performance of government. Performance rests on perceptions of impartiality, non-
discrimination and absence of corruption (Gilley, 2006: Dahlberg and Holmberg, 
2014), qualities that OFGs can bring to bear in relation to governments’ treatment 
of future generations. Experimental research by Alan Jacobs and Scott Matthews 
(2012; 2017) suggests that the public lacks trust in the capacity of political elites to 
deliver on long-term policy issues. This is driven by uncertainty linked to the high 
degrees of causal complexity of many long-term policy challenges and the lack of 
confidence in public officials to deliver the public goods they have promised, 
especially when such promises cut across electoral cycles. The presence of an 
OFG can play a role in ameliorating uncertainty, particularly as they represent the 
insertion of an impartial actor within the political process that can be trusted to 
continue the promotion of long-term issues over time – and importantly across 
changes in government. 
But the dissolution of the Israeli Commission and the downgrading of its Hungarian 
counterpart cast doubt on the democratic legitimacy of OFGs. In both cases, the 
very existence of these institutions was brought into question by elected politicians. 
After its first term ended in 2006, the Israeli Commissioner was not replaced and a 
bill of annulment for the institution was brought to the Knesset. The Commissioner 
saw this as a ‘backlash’ from amongst Members of the Knesset as his power and 
influence increased within and outside parliament with the publication of opinions 
on Knesset legislation and attention from media bodies: ‘The more the 
Commission’s voice was heard, the more the criticism increased’ (Shoham, 2010: 
124). A Knesset Research and Information Center review suggests that ‘Members 
of Knesset raised two primary reasons for dissolution of the Commission during 
deliberations on the topic: the cost of its operations and their feelings that the 
Commission received too much authority to interfere in their work’ (Teschner, 2013: 
3). Shlomo suggests that one source of antagonism was his authority to speak for 
future generations, in particular on the part of more religiously orthodox politicians 
who worried about what they saw as a secular bias in his interventions:
I have been asked – more than once – if we have the authority to make any 
kind of decision for future generations, and if so, where it comes from… 
How do I allow myself to speak in the name of those who have not yet been 
born? How do I decide what policy is good or appropriate for them and what 
is not? (Shlomo 2010: 105)
Reflecting on the institution’s fate, Jonathan Boston notes: 
7The early demise of the Commission offers a number of salutary lessons for 
policy-makers in other advanced democracies who might contemplate 
creating a similar kind of institution. Above all, it suggests that a statutory 
basis, a physical location in the heart of a country’s main representative 
institution, and significant rights of access to information and to key 
decision-makers, although obviously helpful conditions, are not sufficient for 
success. (Boston, 2016: 330)
The fate of the Hungarian Commissioner shows some resonance with the Israeli 
case. The dominance of the right-wing Fidesz government led to the adoption of a 
new Hungarian constitution in 2011 which aimed to eradicate many of the state’s 
checks and balances. Additionally, the Commissioner was vulnerable because it 
had found itself at odds with financially significant supporters of the governing 
regime in high profile actions. To the surprise of most commentators, the 
Commissioner had a partial stay of execution with the weaker Deputy Ombudsman 
for Future Generations established under the country’s General Ombudsman. This 
change of mind appears to have been driven by a political reinterpretation of the 
protection of future generations and the environment in explicitly nationalist terms 
(Interview 2017).
Three challenges to the existence and practice of OFGs can be teased out from 
these criticisms of the Hungarian and Israeli OFGs that mix both normative and 
sociological aspects of democratic legitimacy. First, the legitimacy of a non-elected 
body intervening in the political process, particularly constraining the actions of the 
legislature or the executive. Second, the political vulnerability of a body that 
represents future generations. Third, the capacity of the body to make sound 
judgements about the interests of future generations.
Democrats are often suspicious of the legitimacy of unelected bodies when they are 
empowered to constrain the decisions of elected assemblies, governments and 
other public and private bodies. Taken in isolation, such independent bodies appear 
unaccountable and as such undermine democratic principles. But this is to 
misunderstand the political and legal status of such agencies. Pierre Rosenvallon is 
one of a limited number of democratic theorists who has given prolonged attention 
to the role and legitimacy of independent agencies. Such bodies have a long 
historical pedigree as a part of democratic architecture which can be traced back to 
the overseers, auditors, supervisors and public ombudsman chosen by lot or 
elected in classical Athens (Rosenvallon, 2008: 25). In contemporary democracies, 
such institutions are typically created by elected legislatures in recognition of ‘risks 
8of dysfunctionality’ within the political system (ibid: 74-5; for a similar argument, see 
Pettit 2012: 306). In the case of OFGs, this is a recognition of the tendency of 
democratic institutions towards harmful short-termism, where the effects of current 
policy on future generations is not given due weight. 
OFGs are granted independent status and powers by law and thus have what 
Rosanvallon terms ‘derivative legitimacy’ (Rosanvallon, 2011: 87). As creations of 
statute, they can be held accountable by the legislature and their powers revoked, 
as was the cases of Israel and Hungary demonstrate. Much of the normative ire 
directed towards independent unelected institutions in democracies is focused on 
those bodies that have entrenched constitutional protection and which are able to 
wield power over elected assemblies, in particular the capacity of the judiciary in 
constitutional democracies to override government decisions (e.g. Waldron, 2006). 
No OFG has to date had this kind of constitutional status or power. Where 
constitutional protection for OFGs is suggested by some advocates (e.g. Ekeli, 
2007), these bodies would be subject to removal, but the higher threshold for action 
on the part of the legislature raises normative concerns amongst some democratic 
theorists. Whatever the threshold, it is the capacity of the legislature to both create 
and revoke the powers of independent agencies that distinguishes such institutions 
from anti-democratic argument for guardians beyond the control of democratic 
politics (Brennan, 2016; Shearman and Smith, 2007)
Even if a sound normative case can be presented for the existence of such non-
elected bodies in the democratic polity, in practice this is one of the grounds on 
which the status of both the Israeli and Hungarian OFGs were attacked. Their right 
to exist in a form that allowed them to materially affect political decision making was 
brought into question by elected politicians. Both the Hungarian and Israeli 
Commissioners lasted one full term only before their respective reorganization and 
annulment. The fate of the these two OFGs raises a significant dilemma. Such 
bodies are created by governments in recognition of the structural tendency to favor 
the short over the long term. But then the self-same government, in finding itself 
frustrated by the activities of the OFG, abolishes the oversight institution with 
relatively few political costs. Institutions designed to challenge short-termism 
themselves become victims of short-term politics.
OFGs are especially politically vulnerable compared to most other independent 
agencies that have a significant political constituency advocating for their 
establishment and continued existence. OFGs typically lack sustained political 
support within the polity because the very people whose interests they aim to 
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generalist, future-oriented institution as a crucial vehicle for advancing their 
particular interests and concerns’ (Boston, 2016: 331). As Boston continues:
As a result, any commission (or other public entity) for future generations 
runs the risk of having few friends and defenders. At the same time, it is 
bound to generate enemies. Among these will be all those with a vested 
interest in existing policy arrangements and who expect to be net losers 
from the kinds of policy investments advocated by a future-oriented 
institution. Ironically, therefore, such institutions are destined to encounter 
the same political challenges and temporal asymmetries that they are 
designed to alleviate. If they fail to meet these challenges, they will become 
yet further victims of the presentist bias. (Boston, 2016: 331)
OFGs are unlikely to sustain cross-party support in parliament – the nature of the 
institution means that it will continually challenge many of the core policies and 
projects of governing and opposition parties. As Rosanvallon argues, such 
independent agencies ‘remain precarious, always open to challenge, and 
dependent on social perceptions of institutional actions and behavior’ (Rosanvallon 
2011: 7). 
The third legitimacy challenge faced by OFGs is their capacity to make claims on 
behalf of future generations. OFGs practice a form of surrogate representation. 
After all, they cannot be authorized or held accountable by those they claim to 
represent (Karnein, 2017: 95). An extensive literature exists on the representation 
of future generations within moral and political philosophy. For example, the non-
identity problem posits that present choices will not only affect the quality of life of 
future generations, but who actually composes those generations. Our current 
decisions effect who will or will not exist. In these existential terms, it is impossible 
to talk about the interests of future generations. Debates rage as to whether this 
philosophical conundrum can be overcome (e.g. Heyward 2008). But this way of 
conceiving our duties to future generations has little purchase in practical politics. 
Here the debate is whether a particular Commissioner is best placed to make 
judgements where diverse and competing political conceptions of the future exist, 
rather than whether such judgements are possible at all.
OFGs face a daunting challenge of selecting the issues on which to focus their 
attention: how to prioritize action across a broad policy landscape. This might seem 
like a purely scientific task: select those issues that have the most impact on future 
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generations. Putting aside epistemological challenges to our understanding of the 
causal relationships between our actions and future conditions, long-term issues 
are not purely scientific or technical in nature. Expert knowledge takes us only so 
far and over-extends itself in relation to the normative judgements that are typically 
at the core of long-term decision making. Additionally, these normative judgements 
are often required in areas of policy where public opinion – and arguably the 
judgements of political elites – is not well defined (MacKenzie and Warren, 2012).
A common tendency is to view future generations and their interests as an 
aggregate. But, as Simon Caney argues, this is deeply problematic, as it ‘tolerates 
outcomes in which some lead appalling lives’ (Caney, 2009: 171). Differentials of 
social and economic power are expressed within and between future generations 
and any policy choice will have distributional impacts across each generation – and 
this includes across current generations (Boston, 2016: 29-31). For example, those 
social groups that make up near and far generations (and those in between) will be 
differently affected by climate change and the costs and benefits of investing in 
mitigation and adaptation strategies. Hence judgements by an OFG as to the 
(un)acceptable impact of policy cannot assume that future generations speak with 
one voice; rather it will involve balancing the variety of interests within and across 
future (and current) generations. Normative judgements are to be made.
Shoham attempts to sidestep the criticism that he promoted a particularly secular 
vision of the future in the Israeli Knesset by arguing that he ‘sought to ensure that 
future generations would have the broadest spectrum of choices possible’ 
(Shoham, 2010: 105). Sustainable development was adopted by the Commission 
as a ‘conceptual platform’ that ‘provides a systematic rule, or measurement of 
action that needs to be carried out in the present time in order to do justice to future 
generations – leaving them the space for choice’ (Shoham and Levy 2006: 255). 
But this is to circumvent the very political battles that rage over what sustainable 
development means in practice and what the boundaries of the ‘space for choice’ 
should look like, particularly where different religious and other interpretations of the 
good life are in play. Any ‘systematic rule’ only operates in fairly abstract terms. A 
similar challenge emerges for those who suggest that the focus should be on the 
relatively narrow and objective task of realizing critical or basic needs across 
generations (Ekeli 2007, Johnson 2007). While this approach again appears to offer 
a simple answer to how an OFG should come to judgements, it not only requires 
agreement on what constitutes basic needs, but also provides no guidance on how 
to manage the distributional challenges that arise when considering how these 
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needs are to be realized within and across generations when faced with a plethora 
of policy options.
Critics also raise the question of whether the representation of future generations 
should rest with a single individual. The worry here is the partiality of judgements. 
This could be read as a concern that individual Commissioners will use their 
position to advance their own interests in the name of future generations. But even 
if we do not have reason to challenge the motivations of a Commissioner, we can 
recognize that their judgements will be limited by their social perspectives. On the 
grounds of plurality, parliament could be seen as better placed to make these 
judgements. But this is to neglect that is the very failure of parliament to consider 
the long-term consistently – shaped and constrained as it is by electoral cycles and 
the power of special interests – that has led to the emergence of OFGs. 
Rosanvallon recognizes the need for more plural perspectives in informing the 
judgements of independent agencies, arguing that the tradition of collegial panels in 
France – commissioners as opposed to a single commissioner – or the US practice 
of bipartisan commissions improves representativeness in the sense that agencies 
are then more structurally pluralistic (Rosanvallon 2011: 88), allowing for the 
development of a more collective intelligence (ibid, 92-4). Anja Karnein adds a twist 
to this argument for pluralizing Commissioners: ‘There should be several of them 
(maybe separately assigned to represent different parts of the future: the near, the 
medium, and the long term, for instance) in order to include various possible 
viewpoints’ (Karnein 20017: 94). While explicitly tackling the plurality challenge to 
the legitimacy of OFGs, the membership of such Commissions remains relatively 
restricted in terms of numbers and social perspective. Here the parallels with 
criticism of judicial review resonate: what is the normative basis on which one or a 
small number of undoubtedly socially privileged Commissioners can make political 
judgements about the interests of future generations?
Enhancing democratic legitimacy through public participation
Suggesting that forms of public participation offer a way of enhancing the 
democratic legitimacy of OFGs may seem counterintuitive, given that the 
disposition of the public towards the long-term is widely recognized as a 
fundamental determinant of short-termism in politics (MacKenzie, 2017a). 
Psychologists and economists highlight how individuals’ perceptions, judgements 
and decisions are affected by positive time preferences and discounting of the 
future (Frederick et al, 2002). From a sociological perspective, everyday social 
practices ‘locked-in’ to unsustainable systems of provision, such as energy, 
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transport and food systems, reinforce immediate consumption over longer-term 
rhythms and time scales (Pahl et al, 2014: 379). Whichever conceptual approach 
we take to understanding the perspectives of the public, it does not appear that 
public engagement would be fertile ground for long-term thinking. 
But this is an oversimplification. Citizens’ perspectives on future generations are 
highly structured by the context in which they are articulated. In making immediate 
and everyday decisions, a long-term perspective is rarely taken (although ‘life 
transcending interests’ (Thompson, 2009) do motivate some). But that is a very 
different context from engaging with an institution such as an OFG, particularly 
where that engagement is structured to orientate citizens explicitly towards 
consideration of the long-term and future generations.
What is it then that participation might offer to overcome legitimacy deficits? While 
public participation cannot fully overcome the challenges to legitimacy experienced 
by OFGs, it can potentially ameliorate these vulnerabilities in two related ways. First 
participation can enable more inclusive judgements about the interests of future 
generations. Second, participation can enhance the political standing of OFGs.
The potential for public participation to bring in a diversity of voices and 
perspectives on the interests of future generations offers a creative response to the 
temporal plurality problem and develops feminist insights about the significance of 
social positionality. If the politically and socially excluded are not present, decisions 
made in their name are unlikely to respond to their concerns (e.g. Phillips, 1996; 
Young, 1996). Since the non-presence of future generations cannot be overcome, a 
second-best solution is needed. Social positionality remains significant when we 
recognize that, in drawing on their diverse social, political, economic and 
environmental experiences and identities, social groups within current generations 
are likely to come to different judgements on what is in the interests of future 
generations. Thus, ensuring the widest participation of social groups – especially 
those whose voices are often not heard – in coming to public judgements provides 
a diversity of perspectives on what those different future interests may entail, 
allowing us to understand where there is agreement and divergence across groups. 
This is not to discount the importance of legal and scientific expertise and advice; 
rather to recognize that richer normative judgements that better reflect the plural 
character and interests of future generations will emerge from public participation 
strategies that engage with and across diverse communities.
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Participation – especially where it engages with the most politically vulnerable – can 
also be seen as an important source of normative legitimacy for those concerned 
about the status of (quasi-)independent sources of power within democratic polities. 
Participation embeds a different form of accountability to traditional electoral 
processes, but a form with normative force. 
While good normative reasons exist for encouraging more plural judgements, 
participation can have significant sociological impacts. Rosanvallon, for example, 
suggests that the ‘representativeness’ of independent agencies can be 
strengthened:
in a pragmatic sense if it is open to social input and attentive to the 
aspirations and demands of citizens. To be representative then means to be 
attentive to social problems, conflicts, and divisions. It also means to be 
concerned about diversity and to show particular solicitude for those citizens 
likely to have difficulty in making their voices heard. Finally, it means being 
attentive to certain specific social needs and willing to accord society’s least 
visible members their rightful place and dignity. (Rosanvallon, 2011: 88)
Public participation is the obvious means through which such ‘social input’ and 
attentiveness ‘to the aspirations and demands of citizens’ is realized.
Given the lack of an extant constituency to bolster the political standing of an OFG, 
participation strategies that enhance attentiveness to the diversity of public 
concerns is one strategy to embolden the perceived legitimacy of an independent 
body. For the public, responsiveness can distinguish the practices of OFGs from 
other political institutions that are perceived to be ‘out of touch’ and ‘elitist’. It is an 
avenue for what Colin Scott (2000) terms ‘downward accountability’ – directly from 
independent agency to citizens. Designed well, public participation can be a 
strategy for enhancing impartiality, non-discrimination and anti-corruption, practices 
that are key to judgements of procedural performance (Gilley, 2006; Dahlberg and 
Holmberg, 2014).  The public support that participation can engender increases the 
political capital of OFGs in the eyes of elites, making these agencies less 
vulnerable to political attack when they challenge short-term electoral motivations 
or the power of vested interests.
The participation practices of OFGs
The actual practice of OFGs is instructive in the ways in which participation has 
been enacted to build aspects of normative and sociological legitimacy. In his 
account of his experience as the Knesset Commissioner, Shoham uses the term 
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‘enhancing participatory democracy’ to capture some of the Commission’s practices 
(Shoham, 2010: 107). But this appears to be a misnomer for what he describes 
under this heading is better understood as a public communication rather than 
participation strategy. The Commission was clearly concerned to build its legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public and parliamentarians, seeing the value of interaction with 
the public as ‘an opportunity to introduce the Commission’s parliamentary power’ 
and to shape public discourse around the concepts of future generations and future 
thinking (ibid).
The Hungarian Commissioner embodies a more explicitly participatory approach 
through its ombudsman function. The capacity of the public to make 
representations acts as a mechanism for building public credibility and political 
capital, as well as a means of structuring the OFG’s program of work. Fülöp, the 
first and only Commissioner, argues that ‘we did not want to project our own vision. 
With over 200 substantive complaints per year, there was no need to invent new 
problems’ (Interview, 2017). A complaints system ensures a degree of 
responsiveness on the part of an OFG, although this is not the most effective 
mechanism for ensuring the diversity of voices is heard as it tends to attract the 
already politically active and confident. The Commissioner was aware of the 
dangers of listening to those most active within the political system: ‘We preferred 
to work direct with local communities rather than NGOs’ (ibid). While one-term was 
not enough time to establish the necessary degree of sociological legitimacy to 
defend the institution against reform, the Hungarian Commissioner was following 
the pattern of previous ombudsmen where their representative function emboldens 
political status:  
a number of cases… show how ombudsmen have managed to become 
politically important actors and effective defenders of citizens’ rights even 
when they may have been created primarily as symbols, and in spite of the 
difficulty of promoting sensitive issues in a generally unfavourable context... 
It appears that it is the flexibility and versatility of the ombudsman, as well as 
its character as a representative of the citizens that gives it a potential for 
political prominence that may go beyond its formal powers. (Beckman and 
Uggla, 2017: 123)
Beyond its ombudsman function, the Hungarian Commissioner acted as a 
champion of public participation more generally across the polity. Drawing 
motivation from the Aarhus Convention,1 the Commissioner consistently argued 
that the realization of the constitutional right to a healthy environment required 
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special attention to rights to environmental information and public participation 
(Hungarian Parliamentary Commissioner, 2011; 2012). 
The importance of broadening public participation is also well expressed in the 
Welsh example. As part of the development of the Wellbeing of Future Generations 
(Wales) Act, the then Sustainable Futures Commissioner, Peter Davies (whose role 
it was to develop the legislation at which point the role was dissolved), led an 
extensive national conversation – ‘The Wales We Want’ – that engaged with 
communities, civil society organizations and others across the nation. One of the 
seven foundations for wellbeing of future generations established within the Act 
through this process states: ‘Greater engagement in the democratic process, a 
stronger citizen voice and active participation in decision making is fundamental for 
the well-being of future generations’. The Commissioner for Future Generations 
thus has the legislative basis to promote citizen participation across public bodies in 
Wales and to embed participation as a fundamental element of its own working 
practices.
The Commissioner appears to be taking this role seriously. It employed an active 
public participation strategy in the consultation process for its Strategic Plan 2017-
2023,2 engaging 1,300 people via an online tool, workshops and face-to-face 
conversations sessions. No details of the socio-demographics of those engaged or 
the depth of participation has been published, but the actions of the Commissioner 
both broadens the perspectives that will inform the Commission’s priorities and 
work program and raises the profile of the body amongst the public. Secondly, 
within the Strategic Plan there is an explicit commitment to: ‘Champion effective 
public involvement and engagement, challenging ourselves and others to better 
understand the needs of our communities, our people and their influence on 
the decisions that affect them’ (Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, 2017: 
6). 
The way in which the Welsh Commissioner has begun to reach out to communities 
and other stakeholders to develop its priorities points towards a more extensive 
embedding of public participation in the workings of the OFG itself. Such an 
approach would move beyond public communication and the promotion of public 
participation by other public agencies to embodying a two-way dynamic in its own 
institutional practices. This is the logical extension of the Welsh Commissioner’s 
commitment to ‘Walk the talk – challenging our team to be the change we want to 
see in others’ (Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, 2017: 8). The potential 
is there for the emergence of a novel form of independent and participatory agency 
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that is more effective in strengthening its normative and sociological legitimacy: a 
body that is able to respond to the challenges of temporal plurality and political 
vulnerability.
Designing participation for the long-term: the promise of deliberative mini-
publics
Both the Hungarian and Welsh Commissioners have used public engagement to 
frame their activities and in so doing raise their public profile. The complaints 
system of the Hungarian Commissioner has a significant agenda-setting function 
and provides a mechanism through which individuals and groups can alert the 
Commissioner to potential breaches of the constitutional duty to protect future 
generations. Beyond that point, participation opportunities are fairly limited. The 
consultation processes in Wales have been undertaken as part of setting the broad 
objectives of the original Future Generations (Wales) Act and then establishing 
priorities for the Commissioner. Targeting the participation of community-based 
organizations means that the open consultation process moves beyond only 
hearing from those who are already politically interested and active on issues 
relating to future generations (e.g. environmental organizations who push that 
aspect of the long-term agenda). While this form of consultation engages a wider 
public, it tends to be rather broad brush, operating at the level of general principles 
and values, with little opportunity to explore complex issues and trade-offs in much 
depth. Conversations are also between community groups and the OFG: it is not a 
strategy that encourages sustained interaction and understanding across different 
social groups and communities and leaves the integration of the insights from 
different actors to the discretion of the OFG.  
This sort of intelligence gathering, which can be enhanced by new forms of digital 
crowdsourcing techniques, can be critical for the work of OFGs, alerting them to 
malpractice or the way in which different parts of the community conceive of 
priorities for action. But other modes of participation will be necessary if the aim is 
to bring citizens into more strategic decision-making which will involve the more 
demanding assessment of the trade-offs often implicit within long-term policy 
challenges. Participatory designs will need to be able to deal with the cognitive and 
moral complexity of these issues and bring together a diverse body of citizens to 
ensure a plurality of perspectives are considered. Participatory designs typically 
only achieve one of those elements. For example, while participatory budgeting in 
Latin America has an impressive reputation for engaging large numbers of 
residents from across poorer neighborhoods, this has typically been in demand-
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making forums for local investments. The more strategic policy forums have been 
the venue for experienced activists (Smith 2009). Similarly, policy councils and 
conferences in Latin America have brought citizens into strategic policy dialogues 
with actors from the public and private sectors and civil society organizations, but 
these have typically been those who have an established interest in the policy 
sector under consideration (e.g. health, environment, gender) (Avritzer 2009). While 
policy conferences and councils are afforded time to work through complex policy 
trade-offs, it is forms of stakeholder engagement that predominate, in which 
organized interest groups negotiate and collaborate with public authorities. While 
environmental groups often claim the mantel of protecting the interests of future 
generations, their perspectives rarely extend beyond environmental concerns, and 
they are generally faced with powerful interests looking to preserve the status quo. 
Realizing diversity and ensuring the time and space to work through cognitively and 
morally challenging issues typically pull in different directions within participatory 
designs (Fung 2003; Smith 2009).
A rare and promising design that combines diversity and cognitive rigor is 
deliberative mini-publics (DMPs): bodies in which randomly-selected citizens learn, 
reflect and deliberate on often complex and controversial areas of public policy 
before coming to recommendations. Examples include citizens’ assemblies, 
citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, deliberative polls and planning cells 
(Grönlund et al 2014;; Setälä and Smith, 2018; Smith, 2009).3 DMPs have been 
commissioned to take on a range of tasks, a number of which are explicitly long-
term: consensus conferences organized by the Danish Board of Technology on 
diverse emerging scientific and technological developments; citizens’ juries and 
panels on urban and other forms of planning in Canada, Australia and beyond; and 
a recent citizens’ assembly on the future of social care, organised by two select 
committees in the UK parliament.4 Experiments with citizens’ juries in Australia 
(Hobson and Niemeyer 2011), Canada (2011), the United States5 and the 
international World Wide Views project (Rask et al 2012) provide an indication of 
their potential to consider aspects of climate change. The direct action movement 
Extinction Rebellion has raised the stakes, with its demand for a national citizens’ 
assembly in the UK on the climate and ecological emergency; and the move by six 
select committees in the UK parliament to run a citizens’ assembly on climate 
change indicates the extent to which the model is considered to be particularly well 
suited for such a challenging and complex set of concerns (Smith 2019). 
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While more systematic analysis of the temporal orientation of DMPs is needed, 
evidence from the practice of DMPs suggests that they outperform more traditional 
democratic institutions in orientating participants to consider long-term implications, 
often in areas where preferences are not well formed (Hobson and Neimeyer, 2011; 
MacKenzie and Warren, 2012; Niemeyer and Jennstål, 2017; Parkhill et al, 2013).
The combination of random selection and facilitated deliberation makes DMPs a 
particularly apposite design for public participation on long term issues with 
potentially significant impacts on future generations. Random selection plays two 
functions. First, it generates a socially and cognitively diverse group. Apart from 
deliberative polls (which bring together hundreds of participants for a weekend of 
deliberation), most DMPs apply quota sampling to ensure that the selected body 
broadly reflects the social and cognitive diversity of the population. Common quotas 
include demographic characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, age, education 
and/or social class and, for some designs, salient political attitudes. Often minority 
groups are over-sampled to ensure a larger presence within the body. This 
increases the likelihood that disempowered voices are heard and considered and 
builds confidence amongst politically marginalized groups to articulate their 
perspectives. This in-built diversity of DMPs is critical to ensure that a variety of 
perspectives, drawn from different social positions within society, are present 
amongst participants. DMPs are arguably the most socially and cognitively diverse 
of any democratic institution with contemporary polities.
The second function of random selection recalls the practices of ancient Athenian 
democracy, where sortition (along with rapid rotation) provided a defense against 
asymmetries in social and economic power (Owen and Smith, 2018). Sortition was 
introduced in Athens as a bulwark against powerful waring families. Given that one 
of the drivers for short-termism is the power of entrenched interests, a DMP creates 
a space in which participants are relatively protected from their influence and 
actions. Randomness is a protection against strategic action from those with 
structural power who benefit from current social and economic arrangements that 
privilege the short-term.
The second key design element – facilitated deliberation – orientates participants 
towards consideration of the long-term. Within DMPs, participants have the 
opportunity to learn about the issue at hand, hear from and question a cross-
section of experts and advocates, reflect on what they have heard and listen to the 
views of other participants. Facilitation promotes equality of voice across a diverse 
group that differs significantly in terms of confidence and experience and 
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engenders respectful interactions amongst participants with very different interests 
and perspectives. DMPs approximate the type of communicative rather than 
strategic motivation celebrated by deliberative democrats. Such conditions are 
particularly apposite for encouraging considered judgement (Smith, 2009) or 
collective intelligence (Landemore, 2013) that is sensitive to the interests of future 
generations. Where DMPs are tasked to consider aspects of long-term policy 
making, questions of intergenerational equity are made salient to participants and 
they have time and space to reflect on the long-term consequences of social 
choices, informed by the variety of perspectives offered by fellow participants 
(Niemeyer and Jennstål, 2017: 248). As Michael Mackenzie argues: ‘any short-
sighted claims that are self-serving at the expense of future publics are weaker 
claims for that very reason, and can thus be challenged or rejected on those 
grounds in robust deliberative environments’ (MacKenzie, 2012: 165; see also 
MacKenzie 2018). For Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuss, deliberation is not only ‘fact-
regarding (as opposed to ignorant or doctrinaire)’ and ‘other regarding (as opposed 
to selfish)’, but also ‘future regarding (as opposed to myopic)’ (Offe and Preuss 
1991: 156-57). 
Whether we are thinking of the determinants of short-termism in psychological or 
sociological terms, the combination of random selection and facilitated deliberation 
ameliorate short-term dynamics. In psychological terms, deliberation promotes a 
form of ‘slow thinking’ (Kahneman, 2011) that encourages reflection amongst 
participants, moving them away from the more automatic, fast thinking that guides 
most of our daily actions and choices. In sociological terms, DMPs remove 
participants from their everyday practices that structure thought and action and into 
a space in which collective consideration of the future is encouraged. From both 
perspectives, the combination of task, diversity and deliberation within DMPs 
encourages reflection and judgements that incorporate the interests of future 
generations and protects participants from the short-term determinants of electoral, 
party and interest group politics.6
While DMPs may be a promising institutional space within which participants are 
able to come to judgements that better take account of the interests of future 
generations, the number of participants remains relatively small compared to the 
broader population. But even with such small numbers, emerging research 
suggests that DMPs generate sociological legitimacy: the public have trust and 
confidence in their decision making – either because DMPs are made up of 
‘ordinary citizens’ or because there is a recognition that members have gained a 
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level of expertise through the process (Warren and Gastil, 2015). These are 
promising insights and may offer a way in which trust and confidence on an OFG 
can be built. Recalling the work of Jacobs and Matthews (2012), public perceptions 
in the capacity of governments to respond effectively to long-term issues is 
undermined by the causal complexity of long-term problems and a lack of credibility 
in government action. We have already suggested that the presence of an OFG 
that works across electoral cycles may enhance credibility. The work of DMPs may 
contribute to ameliorating concerns about causal complexity, given the time and 
learning that occurs in these participatory spaces. 
DMPs could be integrated into the work of OFGs in a number of ways that enhance 
the legitimacy of the independent body. Where OFGs have ombudsman functions 
(as in the Hungarian case), DMPs can play the role of ‘contestatory court’ (Pettit, 
2012), judging the veracity of complaints. Similarly, as politically controversial 
issues emerge, DMPs can be employed to bring a considered citizens’ perspective 
to bear. Faced with numerous issues that affect the long-term, DMPs can be 
integrated into the prioritization process, providing guidance on which issues should 
be given priority in the OFGs work. The Citizen Council at the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellent (NICE) in the UK played such a role,7 although its 
influence was rather limited (Davies et al, 2016) and it was not given the time or 
resources to engage in detailed analysis. 
DMPs can be more or less empowered and more or less institutionalized within the 
workings of the OFG. In terms of empowerment, emerging practice from Poland 
provides guidance: municipal mayors have committed to implement any decision 
that emerges from a citizens’ assembly where support is above 80 percent. 
Between 50 to 80 percent, then the mayor has discretion (Gerwin, 2018; Smith 
2019). And in terms of institutionalization, mini-publics could be embedded within 
the everyday practices of an OFG, rather than leaving them to the discretion of a 
Commissioner to decide when they take place. The terms under which mini-publics 
are embedded is critical to ensuring their timing, framing and outputs have import 
on decision making. The potential for more extensive and deeper deliberative 
engagement in organizational governance is yet to be fully exploited by 
independent oversight bodies. Advocates of mini-publics have bemoaned their lack 
of institutionalization (Neimeyer, 2014; Owen and Smith, 2015; Setälä, 2017; Setälä 
and Smith, 2018)8: integrating them into the workings of an OFG would show how 
they can be consequential in the democratic system  Where mini-publics have 
effect as part of the everyday activities of an OFG, we can reasonably expect 
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decisions to emerge that reflect the plurality of perspectives on future generations 
and an increase in publicity and visibility that would embolden the legitimacy of 
OFGs as respected actors within the political arena. The democratic legitimacy of 
OFGs would be enhanced in both normative and sociological terms.
Conclusion
OFGs are a rare example of an institution created to articulate the interests of 
future generations in contemporary democratic polities, where the motivation too 
often is towards the short-term. Given the record of OFGs has not been promising – 
two out of three of the main exemplars lasted for only one parliamentary term; and 
the third is only in its early years of operation – creative thinking is needed to 
develop strategies to bolster the legitimacy of these bodies. Intriguingly public 
participation may offer a creative strategy for emboldening both normative and 
sociological legitimacy. Although it is still in its early stages of establishment, the 
legal framework and activities of the Welsh Commissioner suggest tentative steps 
in this direction. Whether it will be creative in its adoption of designs such as 
deliberative mini-publics is an open question, but if OFGs are to respond effectively 
to the challenges of temporal diversity and political vulnerability, experimentation 
and institutionalization of participatory designs may prove critical.
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